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Abstract 
 
Over the last three decades, the financing and provision of care and support services for disabled 
adults has undergone profound and ongoing change in advanced welfare states. Despite national 
variations in contemporary care and support systems, common characteristics of the ‘mixed economy 
of care’ are its complexity, diversity and inequality of outcomes. Different policy and service 
delivery models for the delivery of care and support services have been developed, implemented and 
promoted as ways in which to enhance the governance of these services. In helping to advance 
research and evaluation into these varied policy and service delivery models, this paper outlines four 
distinct ideal type models of governance of care and support: uncoordinated; case manager 
coordinated; dwelling coordinated and user coordinated. In presenting each governance model, their 
relative strengths and weaknesses are articulated. Each governance model is further illustrated by 
empirical case studies drawn from research conducted in Australia with adults with an acquired 
disability. Such models provide a conceptual, analytical and methodological tool for critically 
thinking about and engaging with policy debate and research into this domain. 
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Models of Governance in Long-Term Disability Care and Support:  
A framework for assessing and reforming social policy 
  
‘Governance’ is a concept of substance. It has gravity and importance, and in the last decade it has 
proliferated as a topic of much academic and practical importance.1 Yet, the practice of managing, 
administering and governing, which is what governance is about, has long existed. The recent 
‘governance’ phenomenon is arguably reflective of a broader redefining of governance in 
contemporary welfare states, and a heightened anxiety about how best to govern. Pragmatic debates 
have focused on what modes and models of governance to utilise, which are most efficient, which 
best reflect the socio-political culture of a nation, and which can be located within the political, 
economic and legal context in which they operate. In contrast, reformist intensions have focused on 
the contextual realities that can be reformulated to install new governance modes and models.  
 
Concerns and questions about governance also reflect (often unrecognised and unspoken) anxieties 
about ungovernability and failures of governance. If governance is not ‘right’ what are the 
consequences of failure? Who will be affected and how? Thus, governance is also about risk and 
responsibility and its management and redistribution. Thus, the question of governance, governability 
and governance failure are of upmost importance, as the 2008-10 global financial crisis and 
recession, and global climate change well illustrate. Not only do they demonstrate the dramatic 
consequences of governance failure, but also the difficulty of governance and how to make 
governance work, especially in domains of great complexity and multiple actors. 
 
Disability is an area of particular governance complexity and anxiety. The immense diversity of 
impairment is accentuated further by the unique social, policy and institutional structures and 
processes within which personal impairment is experienced. Moreover, these often produce social 
exclusion, neglect and disadvantage. Such issues generate concomitant questions for welfare states in 
terms of responding to and governing socio-economic disparities and difference. This involves 
questions of not only the governance of care and support services, its finance and management, but 
also the governance of disability itself.  
 
In the last decade, the governance of disability services has undergone considerable analysis, 
deliberation and reform in most OECD countries. New organisational arrangements have been 
installed and new funding regimes instituted. These developments respond to particular issues and 
problems within disability services, including increased demand and rising unmet demand for 
services and increasing complexity of impairment and co-morbidities. They are also part of a wider 
policy and service reform agenda arising from two intersecting reform agendas. First, New Public 
Management has involved the installation of business approaches to public sector management, 
market models of service delivery, and management to outcomes and performance measurement 
(Lane, 2000; McLaughlin, Osborne, & Ferlie, 2002; Pollitt, 1993). Second, the citizen or service user 
rights movements has sought to shape policy and service delivery around service users (not 
institutions) who are conceptualised as active, entrepreneurial agents with rights, ideally resulting in 
more responsive and holistic service delivery (Clarke & Newman, 2007; Needham, 2011a).  
 
These public service reforms have generated a continuous flurry of policy and service innovations for 
the provision of services for disable people. As detailed below, these have resulted in shifts from 
deinstitutionalisation to community care and from organisational to personalised funding. The 
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governance of care and support services has varied accordingly, framed and influenced by different 
institutional contexts and ideological persuasions. However, a complex, often uncoordinated, even 
ungovernable, mixed economy of care is a common feature. Still, despite this vigorous reform, 
according to WHO (2011) disabled people still experience poor access to services, and much poorer 
outcomes than the wider community in which they reside, which is suggestive of continuing 
governance failure. For this reason it is pertinent to consider governance from a conceptual 
perspective from which we can begin to understand the different ways in which governance operates 
as distinct models, and conceptually tease out what these different governance models might mean in 
terms of individuals with a disability and governments, their relative strengths and weaknesses, and 
the occasions in which they may fail. 
  
The purpose of this paper is thus firstly conceptual in that it seeks to identify and delineate between 
different ideal typical governance models of care and support services, and to logically determine the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of these various governance models. This conceptual work is 
directed towards analytical and methodological innovation. Analytically, the models enable empirical 
data to be analysed and categorised according to the models, as is illustrated using research 
conducted by the authors later in this paper. This helps to demonstrate and tease out the strengths and 
weaknesses conceptually identified. As argued in the paper’s conclusion, the governance models also 
enable new methodological approaches to conducting and analysing disability services and policy.  
 
To this end, the paper is structured in four parts. The first section briefly presents the three main 
modes of governance articulated in the governance literature – bureaucratic, market and network – 
and the relative strengths and weaknesses of these broad governance modes. This conceptual work 
from the governance literature fruitfully demonstrates that no one mode is perfect, and highlights the 
circumstances in which governance failure can arise. The second section then summarises key shifts 
in disability policy and service delivery in modern welfare states in relation to their governance 
arrangements. Arising from this review, the third section proposes four ideal typical models of 
disability governance and assesses each of their relative strengths, weaknesses and occasions for 
governance failure. In order to demonstrate the experience of moving from conceptual purity to 
research application, each governance model is applied to empirical data from an Australian study 
being conducted by the authors. By applying each conceptual model to empirical data we seek to 
emphasise the key elements of the different governance models and to provide a basis for 
considering the strengths and weaknesses of the models and how these may arise in practice. This 
application thus demonstrates the methodological and analytical usefulness of the models of 
governance to subsequent research, that reality is more complex than conceptual models, and that the 
empirical data illustrate and reinforce the conceptual reasoning in the previous section. The paper 
concludes by reflecting on how the models of disability governance can further policy research, 
evaluation and development particularly in an international context. 
 
The empirical data reported below is based on a research project being conducted by the authors on 
the management and financing of lifetime care and support as a result of an acquired disability in the 
Australian State of Queensland. The project firstly involved a mapping of the institutional policy and 
service context of disability services. Secondly, it involved case studies of 25 adults with high care 
and support needs as a result of an acquired brain injury, spinal cord injury, Huntington’s disease, 
Multiple Sclerosis, or Motor Neuron Disease. Each case study involved separate interviews with the 
adult receiving care services, a family or friend, a care service provider and (where appropriate) a 
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financial manager about the disability services governance and financial arrangements in that case, 
and the experience of their provision.2 A reliable comparative summative measure of each 
individual’s service experience and areas of unmet need was also captured at interview by using a 
modified version of the Service Obstacles Scale (SOS) (Kreutzer, 2000). 
 
Modes of governance 
 
‘Governance’ is an overloaded term. It is used in a variety of ways for different purposes. Despite the 
inherent ambiguity within governance discourses, the governance literature generally recognise and 
discern three different ideal models of governance or modes of coordination – governance by market, 
governance by bureaucracy, and governance by network. In the context of examining economic 
development, Jessop respectively describes these distinct models as ‘the anarchy of the exchange, 
organizational hierarchy, and self-organizing “heterarchy”’ (1998, p. 29). Governance through the 
market is achieved by the self-organizing ‘invisible hand’ through competition in prices and 
maximising of profits. Governance through bureaucracies is achieved through rules and regulations. 
Network governance is through partnerships, dialogue and collaboration. A broad brush history of 
the governance of Anglophone capitalist welfare states in the second half of the twentieth century 
would observe bureaucratic governance ambitions of the post World War period being re-imagined 
as market governance from the mid-1970s, which is then supplanted by network governance in the 
closing years of the century. Each of these shifts in governance involves a search for new governance 
capacities and enhanced governability as well as a response to observed governance failures.  
 
The search by governments for new and improved governance models in relation to previous modes 
of governance is an important process in policy learning. While some advocates may be in search of 
the ‘perfect’ governance model, and indeed, this seems to be the underlying thinking in advocates of 
network or third way approaches to government, Jessop importantly reminds us that there is not one 
perfect approach to providing public services. All governance models are subject to failure. Jessop 
articulation of governance failure is based on the objectives inherent or embedded in governance 
model. Thus, 
“Market failure is usually seen as the failure of markets to provide economically efficient 
allocations in and through pursuit of monetarized private interests… State failure is a failure 
to achieve substantive political objectives defined as in the public interest and enforced as 
necessity against particular interests” (1998, p. 38). 
Further, network governance fails when participating organisations fail to agree on the objectives or 
fail to effectively communicate. However, it is also possible to consider instances of governance 
failure by external objectives, such as improving the health of citizens, producing well educated 
students, or providing quality care that carers are satisfied with. 
 
Transformations in disability governance 
 
The governance of care and support services in Anglophone welfare states can be examined in the 
light of these governance developments, at least at a broad brush. With the development of the 
welfare state during the twentieth century, governments typically created bureaucratic and 
institutional responses to people with disability or mental illness, housing them in large purpose-built 
institutions (or asylums) separated away from society at large. From around the 1970s, policy 
responses began to change as a result of disability rights movements and service attitudes. Under the 
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‘deinstitutionalisation’ policy operating in many Western countries, disabled people or mental illness 
began to be increasingly housed within the community, including their own homes, or small-scale 
special built community-based facilities. Initially the focus was on people with lower levels of 
disability or mental health, but increasingly this has occurred to embrace a wider range of disability 
and mental health capacities (Brunton, 2003; Emerson, 2004; MacKinnon & Coleborne, 2003; 
Young & Ashman, 2004). While there is great variation in the timing, nature, extent and populations 
experiencing deinstitutionalisation, and the effectiveness of this process, it is a shared policy 
movement and practice across the Western world (Mansell & Ericsson, 1996). 
 
This instigation and operation of deinstitutionalisation necessitated new modes and models of 
delivering and financing services. While some people resided in their homes cared for by family 
members, others resided independently in homes, while others lived in community based facilities 
including aged care nursing homes. Financing and operationalising these different dwelling situations 
required different policy settings, such as supporting families’ informal care provision and providing 
respite, funding formal care services to deliver care in people’s homes, and funding the establishment 
and operation of purpose-built facilities or nursing homes. While some community-based facilities 
have been government owned and run, often they are managed by not-for-profit organisations 
(typically church based) or for-profit businesses. In short, what was dominated by the delivery of 
care through state bureaucratic institutions, transformed via deinstitutionalisation into a ‘mixed 
economy of care’ delivered through a mix of informal and market, quasi-market or partnership (ie 
network) governance mechanisms (Le Grand, 1991; Lewis, 1993; Wistow, Knapp, Hardy, & Allen, 
1994; Wistow et al., 1996).  
 
The deinstitutionalisation process has yielded a complex assemblage of care and support. While 
instigated by ideals of humanisation and equality of all persons, a criticism that has emerged in the 
last decade is that care and support services have been driven and directed by providers, rather than 
the service user. This critique has coincided with a wider political discourse about citizens and 
consumer rights (Clarke & Newman, 2007), active citizens and theories of individualization 
(Bauman, 2001; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). As a result, more recent developments in care 
provision have focused on individualised, personalised or holistic care (Needham, 2011b; Yeatman, 
2004, 2009). Again, the governance mechanisms have varied from determining individualised 
packages of care for a specific individual which are managed and delivered by an organisation and 
funded by government, to the government financing of individuals to purchase their pre-determined 
care needs on the open market (Blyth & Garnder, 2007; Duffy, Waters, & Glasby, 2010; Glasby, Le 
Grand, & Duffy, 2009; Caroline Glendinning & Kemp, 2006; Lord & Hutchison, 2010; Prideauz, 
Roulstone, Harris, & Barnes, 2009; Priestley et al., 2007).  
 
Alongside this organisational restructuring is a parallel complexity in financing care and support 
services for disabled people. Following the logic and model of insurance, from which social 
insurance emerged, insurance models have long been in place for individuals who have acquired 
their disabilities through workplace, automobile or medical accidents (Anderson, Heaton, & Carroll, 
2010; Defert, 1991; Fishback & Kantor, 2000). These insurance systems set up a financing 
mechanism to compensate people for acquired disabilities from accidents, thereby establishing a 
delineation between disabled people who are not covered by insurance compensation systems and 
those who are. Moreover, the complexity of insurance financing for acquired disabilities is also 
complex with different sectors covered (workplace, automobile or medical accidents), as well as a 
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mixture of private and state insurance providers, sometimes as monopoly providers and others within 
a regulated or deregulated market.  
 
The mixed economy of care has resulted in a highly complex assemblage of policies, practices and 
financing arrangements. The governance of services has been multiple and complex, often with no 
overarching governance mechanism in place. Arguably, the complexity of care and support for 
disabled people is also a result of the complexity of disability and impairment. Disability is not a 
cohesive experience. Rather there is a great variety of experiences which are related to the individual 
intellectual, physical, psychiatric impairments, but which are also embedded within and impacted by 
specific social contexts, physical environments and disability practices (Thomas 2007). This in turn 
means there are varying impacts on employment and/or education and thus income, personal care, 
domestic help, health needs, accommodation, transport and recreation. Perhaps unsurprisingly the 
governance of care and support services is often segmented along different domains. Social 
protection systems provide private income, health systems provide rehabilitation and therapeutic 
services, accommodation and transport services are further contained in two other segments, and so 
on. 
 
This two-fold complexity in the governance of disability – first, the involvement in state, for profit 
businesses, non-government not-for-profit organisations, and informal private provision, and second, 
the diversity of domains in which support for disabled people  – constitutes a domain that is 
potentially ungovernable and subject to governance failure. Indeed, a recent inquiry described the 
Australian situation as follows: “The current disability support system is underfunded, unfair, 
fragmented, and inefficient, and gives people with a disability little choice and no certainty of access 
to appropriate supports” (Productivity Commission, 2011, p. 2).  
 
At the heart of the matter are the needs of the disabled person to bring these various domains, 
institutions, individuals (professionals, paraprofessionals, family and friends) and finances together 
to support their functioning, activity and participation needs. Taking the perspective of the disabled 
person  these various threads must be woven together to form a fabric of support seamlessly 
enmeshed into one’s life activities and aspirations. This is a key governance issue. Traditionally, the 
perspective has been from government or from care and support service organisations.  
 
The potentially problematic ‘mixed economy of care’ has generated a search few new policy setting 
and governance arrangements, but is an activity with a long history. In order to critically engage in 
this policy analysis and development process, this paper seeks to conceptually delineate different 
modes of care and support governance. It is through the identification of different governance models 
that their relative strengths and weaknesses, the occasions when they operate well and operate 
poorly, can be both conceptually and empirically analysed. Thus, the key analytical objective of this 
paper is how the disparate fragments of care and support can get woven together, what models can be 
discerned and what are the relative strengths and weaknesses of each model. 
 
Models of care and support governance 
 
Drawing on the above literature on care and support governance we propose four ideal typical 
models of care and support governance: uncoordinated; case manager coordinated; dwelling 
coordinated and user coordinated.3 Table 1 summarises the characteristics of each governance model 
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which is described in more detail below. These models are ideal types to delineate the different 
modes of thinking in the literature and policy, and as such enable a comparative analysis. It is 
acknowledged that reality is far more complex. To demonstrate this, we illustrate each governance 
model with a real case study of an adult individual with a high level of long-term care and support 
need as a result of an acquired disability. As discussed above, each case study is drawn from research 
conducted by the authors. These empirical case studies, which use pseudonyms, help to illustrate the 
greater complexity of lived experience of disabled people, but also the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the particular governance model. 
 
Table 1: Four models of disability service governance 
 
Model Uncoordinated Caseworker 
governance 
 
Dwelling  
based governance 
Individual 
governance 
 
Characteristics Separately- 
provided services 
are provided to the 
individual 
uncoordinated 
Services are 
coordinated by a 
case worker 
Services are 
coordinated by 
accommodation 
facility  
Services are 
coordinated by the 
individual (or 
family member) 
Funding Various ‘Pooled’ into case 
worker  
Varied into facility Single from 
individual budget 
Example Default Individual budgets; 
disability insurance 
Community based 
care 
English direct 
payments 
Strengths  Individual at centre, 
nominally in 
control 
Co-ordinated  
Person centred; 
holistic; advocate; 
reduces stress; clear 
accountability 
Co-ordination is  
somewhat person 
centred; reduces 
stress; economies 
of scale  
Personal autonomy 
& choice; 
Innovative markets 
of care; clear 
accountability 
Weaknesses Individual has 
services done to 
them;  little 
autonomy; 
fragmented; diffuse 
accountability 
Depends on case 
worker; lack of 
choice, or control; 
gatekeeper 
Depends on 
dwelling; dwelling 
centred; lack of 
choice/ autonomy; 
hard to change; 
gatekeeper 
Individual risk & 
responsibility;  
adequate financing; 
market 
 
Governance 
failure 
Segmented; 
complex; no 
autonomy; lack of 
finances 
Lack of choice, or 
control; lack of 
finances 
Poor dwelling 
arrangements; 
lack of choice, or 
control; lack of 
finances 
Inability to manage 
funds; market 
failure; lack of  
awareness of 
possible services; 
market failure 
 
Uncoordinated governance model 
 
The uncoordinated model of care and support governance is characterised by an individual receiving 
services that they are deemed to need and have eligibility to receive. The services are managed and 
controlled by the organisations that deliver the services, with no input from the individual. This is 
diagrammatically illustrated in the left hand box of Figure 14, where the individual is the central 
circular node ‘IND’. The square nodes surrounding the individual represent the various service 
organisations providing distinct services, namely personal care (PC), domestic help (DH), respite 
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(Res), accommodation (Acc), disability-related aids and equipments (Aids) and income ($). No doubt 
other services could be included, such as transportation, rehabilitation and therapy, information and 
advocacy, and community engagement. 
 
This ideal type of governance is characterised by individuals having services done to them (as 
illustrated by the ingoing arrows), and the notion that different organisations provide different types 
of services funded by different funding streams. It is a default model in that there is an absence of 
service coordination. The key strengths of this model are that the individual is at the centre and the 
rationale for the services, and that they are nominally in control. The potential weaknesses of the 
model are that the individual actually has services done to them, with little autonomy, and that 
services are fragmented, complex and uncoordinated. Accountability to both individual and 
government is diffuse and potentially problematic. Governance failure is manifest when the services 
fail to address the person’s needs and can arise as a result of several inter-related factors. It can occur 
as a result of lack of financing of services, the segmented or complex service arrangement, poor 
coordination of services, services driven by organisational rather than personal needs, or no 
autonomy to shape care for their own needs and life objectives. 
 
Figure 1: Uncoordinated governance of care and support 
 
  
 
The realities of this governance model can be depicted by an empirical case study (Figure 1, right 
hand box). ‘Anna’ is a 47 year old single woman with Huntington’s disease who has four children. 
Anna lives at home in a public housing dwelling with her youngest child of 17 years who assists her 
mother constantly. As illustrated in the Figure, Anna has four carers, two coordinated from a non-
government organisation (NGO) which provides both personal care and domestic help. These 
services are funded by the organisation and the state disability organisation (as demonstrated by the 
tag ‘NGO1-DS’ on the inwards arrow). A second organisation comes three times per week to assist 
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with showering and one morning a week to provide domestic assistance. Anna’s daughter is her 
fourth carer, and a third NGO provides respite for her daughter. Anna’s income is from the means-
tested Australian government Disability Support Pension, and her aids and equipment have been 
initiated by herself and variously funded by herself, the Queensland Department of Housing and the 
government Medical Aids Subsidy Scheme (MASS). 
 
In this example, Anna finds the NGO1 carer coordinator “helpful.” She is especially satisfied with 
her main carer: “If there is anything going on, she will fix it. She’s good”, and this carer decides for 
Anna “because I can’t make up my mind anymore”. However, the care is uncoordinated and involves 
many people. Anna’s experience is there are “lots of different people” coming to her home and it 
“gets confusing” and Anna feels “terrible.” The care and support arrangement in this individual 
example is seemingly precarious, as depicted by the Anna’s expression “I’d be buggered” without 
her main carer, or daughter and perception of insufficient care hours from NGO1 for cooking and 
washing, due to insufficient funds: “It’s a big problem.” In this example, Anna is not getting help on 
weekends, but relies on her daughter. As Anna’s daughter only has learners’ drivers permit, Anna 
relies on her main carer for transportation. Anna also lacks the financial resources to pay personally 
for medical rehabilitation and disability-related services, despite the perceived need for 
physiotherapy for balance and back pain issues. In responding to the Services Obstacles Scale, Anna 
reported agreement with the statements “I have little confidence in the quality of care now being 
provided” and “I don't know if there are good care and support resources in my community”, which 
can be interpreted as reflecting the arising from the complexity and lack of autonomy of her 
situation. However, Anna reported satisfaction with the amount of professional help and support, 
transportation, and money for disability related services, which may not be entirely consistent with 
her descriptive account. Anna’s responses on the Services Obstacles Scale reinforced these 
observations. She agreed with the following statements: ‘I am dissatisfied with the amount of 
professional help and services being provided”; “Transportation is a major obstacle toward getting 
enough help”; “Lack of money to pay for medical, rehabilitation, and injury related services is a 
major problem”; and “For my problems, there are very few resources in the community”. Anna did, 
however, express confidence in the quality of care she received and her knowledge of care and 
support services in the community. 
 
Anna’s case study illustrates a number of characteristics of the uncoordinated governance model of 
disability services. The complexity of multiple people and funding sources is problematic, confusing 
and generates dissatisfaction. Because care and support is uncoordinated it fails to maximise the 
effects of the services to the benefit of the individual, and there is little autonomy to improve this. 
Funding clearly limits what level of service is achievable. As a result of funding and lack of 
autonomy, the individual has very little capacity to reduce the precarious nature of her support 
infrastructure. 
 
Caseworker governance model 
 
One policy and service delivery response to the lack of coordination has been to install case workers 
to manage and coordinate an individual’s case and support needs. This is illustrated in the left hand 
box of Figure 2. The outward going arrows from the caseworker (CW) to the care and support 
services indicate that the caseworker is initiating and coordinating them on behalf of the individual 
who receives them (inward pointing arrow to IND). Funding for these services can occur either 
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through the diverse range of funding streams (as with the uncoordinated model). Alternatively, 
funding can be directly provided to the caseworker with which to ‘purchase’ services on behalf of the 
individual. Individual care packages or budgets managed by a caseworker are examples of this 
model, as is disability insurance models whereby compensation funding is provided to a caseworker. 
A clear strength of this model is the services are actively coordinated by someone with knowledge of 
the individual’s needs and the care and support service sector, who can act as an advocate for the 
individual. It is more likely to be person-centred, with more holistic service provision a key feature 
of the design. Such coordination is also likely to avoid the stress on the individual about the 
organisation and adequacy of care. It also provides a locus of accountability to both the individual 
and government for the quality of care and finances. Negatives could include that the quality of the 
services is partly based on the quality of the caseworker, and this coordination role can lead to a lack 
of individual choice and control or autonomy, especially if the caseworker acts as a gatekeeper. 
These are the situations that can lead to the failure of this governance model, as well as lack of 
funding for services (see Table 1). 
 
Figure 2: Caseworker coordinated governance of care and support 
 
  
 
The right-hand side of Figure 2 illustrates the caseworker coordinated model with the case study of 
‘Beth’, aged 47 with a spinal cord injury. Beth lives in public housing, with care and support 
coordinated by a dedicated spinal cord injury NGO. The services coordinated by this organisation are 
funded under a special Queensland government program, Spinal Cord Injury Response (SCIR). As is 
illustrated in the Figure, the NGO coordinates four rotating carers who come three times per day, for 
up to eight and a half hours at a time, and personal carers are arranged for holidays. Psychological 
counselling was also accessed; however, funding for this service was presumably capped as Beth was 
unable to access psychology services on an ongoing basis. Although Beth perceived a need for more 
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therapeutic services, including psychology, she was not able to afford private physiotherapy, 
psychology and psychiatry services. By contrast, Beth’s air-conditioner was funded from unused 
carer hours for one year, and an emergency grant of $2000 towards her fully adjustable bed was 
funded by the same organisation. The government Medical Aids Subsidy Scheme contributed to a 
power-assist wheelchair, to which Beth personally contributed from her own funds. Personal income 
in this example comes from a partial government Disability Support Pension as well as from private 
superannuation.  
 
The caseworker clearly plays an important role in the providing Beth’s services, but Beth is also 
active in her own care governance. Beth and her caseworker negotiate hard for what Beth regards she 
needs and “deserves”. She interviews and selects her carers, although perceives the quality of staff is 
not high, as it “isn’t the top shelf job that you are getting”. While Beth is satisfied with the level of 
personal care and domestic support she receives, she dislikes the intrusion of such carers – “it drives 
me insane” – and is not satisfied with having carers in the house as she feels that they are in control 
and not her. She feels “railroaded” by some of them. High staff turnover of carer workers and 
psychologists is also an area of dissatisfaction. While Beth has an assessed package of care that is 
managed by her case worker, the NGO has discretion over the expenditure of unused care hours at 
the end of the year. Interestingly, while personal care hours allocated to Beth might be unused at the 
end of the year, these are not automatically rolled over to her. Rather, the organisation decides in 
consultation with their government funding agency. This is perceived as unfair by Beth, “If they are 
your hours, you should be allowed to have access to them for equipment and things that you may 
need”. In her responses to the Services Obstacles Scale, Beth strongly agreed that “lack of money” 
for services is a major problem, and agreed that there were “very few [support] resources in [her] 
community”. She did, however express satisfaction with transportation to access help.  
 
This case illustrates the potential strength of an active caseworker in making this model of 
governance operate effectively. Yet is also illustrates that caseworkers within organisations can use 
their position as caseworkers for several clients to shift resources among them to achieve what they 
perceive as fair and equitable, even if not in the best interests of a specific individual. The case also 
reinforces the observation that adequate resourcing is essential for any governance model of care and 
support services to operate successfully. 
 
Dwelling based governance model 
 
As already noted, appropriate accommodation for disabled people has been a central policy concern 
in recent times, and resulted in a shift from institutionalised care to community based care, either in 
one’s home or in community facilities. The provision of care and support in specialised community-
based facilities demarcates the third governance model of care and support (see left hand side of 
Figure 3). In many respects this model mirrors that of the caseworker governance model. However, 
in this model, the responsibility for coordinating services lies with the dwelling in which the 
individual resides, not a caseworker. This is illustrated by the arrows going outwards from ‘Acc’ to 
the various care and support services and to the individual (IND). Funding of this model is varied, 
but is pooled into the dwelling either for each individual or collectively for all residents in the 
facility. Potential strengths include the coordination of services on behalf of the individual, thereby 
reducing stress and worry, as well as clear locale of accountability. Another likely benefit of this 
model is that is enables economies of scale through the coordination and provision of services to 
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multiple people residing in the one dwelling. While service coordination can be person-focused, a 
possible weakness is that this person-focus is balanced by the overall dwelling needs and those of 
other residents. In this respect, the governance model may involve reduced personal choice and 
autonomy, with the dwelling acting as a gatekeeper, and the capacity to change dwellings is typically 
quite difficult and onerous. The model is likely to lead to failure when the dwelling and its 
management is of poor quality and resourcing is inadequate (see Table 1). 
 
Figure 3: Dwelling based governance of care and support 
 
  
 
The right-hand side of Figure 3 illustrates the dwelling governance model with the case study of a 38 
year old mother of four children, with an acquired brain injury. ‘Cath’ has 24 hour care in a house 
with two other women and three support workers, as illustrated in the top left-hand part of the figure. 
She lives close by to her husband and children where she goes “home” on weekends, and where her 
care is provided by her husband. While her dwelling coordinates her main care and support, Cath has 
several agencies involved in her care as evidenced in the figure by the number of services for 
psychology and psychiatry (Psych), two sources for aids and equipment (Aids & Aids2), and 
physiotherapy (Physio). However, there is referral and liaison between some of these varied 
organizations to reduce the problems associated with uncoordinated service delivery evident in the 
uncoordinated governance model. Cath is generally satisfied with her accommodation, which she 
perceives to be suited to her needs: “When I’m here at the house I feel pretty comfortable.” She has 
the choice of cooking meals and inviting visitors. “And it makes you feel good. They make you feel 
like you’re in your own home and you’re a normal person. They treat you like everyone else.” 
However, Cath also perceives a lack of choice about carers and dislikes having a male carer: “I have 
to go to the bathroom even though I feel very uncomfortable because he is a male. And showering, I 
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don’t have to shower when he is on.” Overall, Cath is satisfied with the quality of her current care, as 
expressed by her responses on the Services Obstacles Scale. Prior to her current dwelling, she had a 
series of unsatisfactory dwelling arrangements, initially an aged care facility upon being discharged 
from hospital, then at home where her husband was unable to manage, then another provider which 
she disliked due to poor care. While she would prefer to be home permanently, this choice is not 
possible due to resources and family relationships. Financial resources are also a difficulty. Cath’s 
husband has insufficient funds to manage the household, and the additional expenses incurred to 
provide for her. As a result, Cath is now in receipt of the government Disability Support Pension 
which she finds inadequate: “If I don’t get any more money from Centrelink to help fund what I’m 
doing at the moment then I can’t recover or get any better.” This is also reinforced in her strong 
agreement to the statement “Lack of money to pay for medical, rehabilitation and disability related 
services is a major problem” from the Service Obstacles Scale. Cath also perceived there were “very 
few resources in the community” for her problems. 
 
This case study illustrates some of the strengths and weaknesses of the dwelling based governance 
model. The coordination of care and support through the organisation meant that there was little 
concern by Cath and indeed the quality of the dwelling facilities and how it is run makes it a 
satisfying experience. However, she did perceive a lack of control over the carer in relation to having 
a male carer on some shifts. The issue of finances also was raised as a critical element to ensure 
success. 
 
User coordinated governance model 
 
In response to the disability rights movements and ideas about active users of public services, a 
fourth model for disability governance has been widely promoted, namely, services are defined and 
managed by the person receiving care. This model is illustrated in the left hand side of Figure 4 with 
the arrows of coordination moving outwards from the individual, and is thus the reverse of 
uncoordinated governance model. Alternatively, a family member can act on behalf of the individual, 
where this model starts to blur with the caseworker governance model. The rationale and potential 
strength of this model is that the individual has control and autonomy over their care and support 
needs and is regarded as the one who knows best what they need. As a consequence, they can shape 
the package of services and their timing to their personal aspirations. To enable this individual-based 
coordination, funding is ideally provided to the individual to cover a range of services. This is 
evidenced in policies of direct payments in England (Blyth & Garnder, 2007; Glasby, et al., 2009; 
Priestley, et al., 2007) and Australia (Fisher et al., 2010), self-directed care in England (Prideauz, et 
al., 2009) and the planned NDIS in Australia (Productivity Commission, 2011). Alternatively, an 
individual budget may be provided to the individual, but managed by a third party, but the individual 
has nominal control over its spending, perhaps within dictated guidelines, such as in the English 
personalised packages of care (Leece, 2004, 2007; Needham, 2011b). The location of accountability 
for finance and quality of care is located at the individual, which can be both a strength, but also a 
unwelcome burden. Another benefit of this governance model is that it promotes a market for care 
and support, which in idealised market conditions promotes service innovation, responsiveness and 
choice. On the flip side, the marketisation of care is also a key weakness as markets can fail to 
develop or provide services, especially where profits are not viable (Greener, 2008). Such market 
failure is particularly pertinent for people living in regional areas where a threshold of services users 
is unlikely to be reached. Another weakness is that the lack of coordination of services may lead to 
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potential difficulties. While the allocation of management control to the individual enables 
autonomy, it also means that the individual assumes responsibility for setting up the care 
arrangements and funding usage. However, as evaluation of the English direct payment scheme has 
revealed, the successful acquisition, coordination and management of an appropriate direct care 
package depends substantially on the availability and capacity of the individual and their informal 
support networks (Blyth & Gardner, 2007). If inadequate resourcing is provided to the individual, 
this model can individualise the systemic failure and lead to blaming the individual for their 
situation. In short, governance failure in this model can occur because of market failure in care 
services, an inability of the individual to manage their funds or to operate as a rational actor, perhaps 
due to a lack of awareness of available services from which to choose, and indeed a lack of funding 
with which to purchase adequate care (Table 1). 
 
Figure 4: User coordinated governance of care and support 
 
 
  
 
The person-centred/individual coordinated governance model of disability services is illustrated by 
the case of ‘Dave’ a 57 year old male, diagnosed with motor neuron disease three years previously 
(see Figure 4, right hand side). Dave is divorced and has a daughter who contributes to his personal 
and domestic care (Carer1). He lives in his own home with a live-in 24/7 carer who provides the 
majority of his personal care and support needs (Carer2) and receives personal care for showering 
three days a week from a NGO financed by a government personal care package (Carer 3). He 
personally employs Carer2 directly from Thailand. He pays for their return flight to Australia, wages, 
board and lodging for three-months and then flies them home again, then employs a new Thai carer. 
In this example, Dave specifically chose these care arrangements after finding the options available 
on the Australian market inappropriate for his needs. His previous experience of carers provided by a 
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NGO was that care was not provided at a time he desired: “I like to have a shower before about ten 
every day. … I don’t really want to sit, especially in summer until three o’clock for someone to come 
and shower me that day and then, seven o’clock one morning and then half past four the next day.” 
Dave then decided that he wanted a live-in carer, but found that Australian options were too 
expensive, involved having three rotating carers a day who may not be needed for most of the time, 
and ultimately there was “just the lack of available services and the willingness of people to come 
in”. In short, self-funding care provides Dave with flexibility to meet his own care needs, as well as 
calmness and companionship. He is in control. This is also reflected in his decision to purchase an 
electric wheelchair rather than borrow from a NGO: “we chose for convenience to buy…I probably 
have about five thousand dollars worth of equipment I purchased myself, only for the ease of picking 
something that was just right”. However, this would not be possible without significant financial 
resources. Dave purchases his services from a disability pension from private insurance, savings 
obtained by selling his business, and remortgaging his house, which he describes as “eat[ing] my 
house.” 
 
This particular case study demonstrates clearly that the user coordinated governance model of care 
and support provides good outcomes for people who have the capacity to organise, direct and finance 
their service needs. They are in control and determine what they want, when and how. However, the 
example also illustrates the possibility that the market does not necessarily provide these services, in 
that in Dave has had to import carers, with new questions for employment and immigration policies. 
 
Conclusion: Deploying governance models as analytical tools 
 
The articulation of the above conceptual governance models for care and support is designed as an 
analytical resource and regarded as a work in progress. In this concluding section the intention is to 
clarify the objective of this model development and signal possible directions for the use of this work 
for policy and empirical analysis. 
 
It is quite clear from the above case studies, that reality is more complex and messy than the 
conceptual governance models. As indicated, the models act as ideal types to highlight key 
differences and to aid conceptual analysis of their relative merits. Real situations can easily involve 
elements from more than one of the four governance models. This is not necessarily a weakness of 
the models, as they can aid analysis of an actual situation for where potential governance failure may 
occur. Moreover, the models assist policy researchers and developers to avoid the hubris of seeking a 
single perfect governance model. All approaches have pitfalls. Rather, it is about balancing 
competing elements. Indeed, Jessop (1998) acknowledges as much. Governance models involve a 
tension between co-operation and competition, openness and closure, governability and flexibility, 
accountability and efficiency. These competing tensions are evident in the governance models 
outlined earlier. Too much flexibility and choice for the individual may result in too much 
complexity, uncertainty and unmanageability on behalf of care providers, and vice-versa. Too much 
accountability for delivery organisations to government may undermine efficiency in services, or 
responsiveness to service users. Too much competition in a market environment may result in lack of 
communication and coordination between different service providers servicing the one person. 
Caseworkers and disability dwellings can act as gatekeepers and withholders of information from 
individuals and undermining their choice and voice. However, one thing is common across all 
models. If there are not sufficient financial resources to fund the necessary care and support, 
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regardless of source, no model will work. A related finding of this analysis is that pooling of 
financial resources is much more likely to facilitate disability service governance than separate 
fragmented streams.  
 
There are, however, limitations to the conceptual analysis of disability service governance above. 
Consideration has not been given to the nature of the organisation or person providing care, whether 
it be informal by family and friends, or formal by organisations, or whether the organisations are 
state, not-for-profit or for-profit. The various strengths and limitations of these must be considered 
separately. 
 
In addition to there being no one perfect governance model, it is also important to observe that some 
models may be more suited to different individuals than others. People with high level cognitive 
abilities are much more likely to be willing and able to manage their own care using the person-
centred/individual coordinated governance model (Blyth & Garnder, 2007; C. Glendinning et al., 
2008). 
 
Apart from the conceptual analysis of governance models, the models and their visual representations 
also provide an analytical tool for empirical work. Clearly, empirical case studies could be 
categorised into the dominant model in place (or using some hybrid where necessary). Such 
categorisation can seek to determine to extent to which each model is in existence. More importantly, 
is the linking of actual case studies to measures of governance success and failure, such as the use of 
Service Obstacles Scales. Further research might consider measurements of unmet need, quality of 
life, poverty or social exclusion, and personal satisfaction and happiness. This will assist in assessing 
the actual success of models. However, in acknowledging that some models are more suited to 
different types of people, empirical research may seek to examine how individual characteristics and 
situations are related to governance success/failure and satisfaction with care.  
 
The visual representation of disability governance is a further analytical tool that we envisage can be 
further developed. In the case studies in this paper, we have included only certain types of services 
that disabled people may utilise. For example, we have not visually included transportation, 
advocacy, information provision, nor support services to (informal) carers. Inclusion of these could 
be done. Visual representations could also aid analysis by generating metrics such as the number of 
organisations (i.e. square nodes) and individuals (i.e. circular nodes) involved in providing care and 
support, the number of service coordinators, the number of services/providers being coordinated for 
each case and the number of edges connecting the individual. Such diagrammatical metrics could be 
utilised for quantitative analysis. Mapping care and support arrangement over time is another 
potentially useful use of the visual representations of care. 
 
Moreover, these methods can also be utilised for regional and international comparative research to 
compare and contrast the patterns of disability governance in different locations and relate this to 
macro-level outcomes, such as poverty, unmet need, satisfaction, and social, political and economic 
engagement. Indeed, this is a task we are currently developing. 
 
In the end, a conceptual focus on governance returns to questions of meta-governmance, which 
Jessop describes as “the organization of self-organization”. It involves “the design of institutions and 
generation of visions which can facilitate not only self-organization in different fields but also the 
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relative coherence of the diverse objectives, spatial and temporal horizons, actions, and outcomes of 
various self-organizing arrangements (1998, p. 42). Conceptual engagement with the governance of 
disability must return to ways in which wider processes and practices can generate disability 
governance that works as defined within those very processes. This is indeed a task not only for 
government policy, but for service providers, disable people, their families and friends, and others 
with a vision for what might be possible.  
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1 See for example, Bevir (2011), Newman (2001, 2005), Rhodes (1997) and Kjær (2004) as well as 
the Blackwell journal Governance. 
2 That research is funded by an Australian Research Council Linkage Grant (LP0883377) with 
industry partner from the Motor Accident Insurance Commission and the Public Trustee of 
Queensland. We gratefully acknowledge the support of this funding, and the contribution of our 
colleagues – Jennifer Fleming, Cheryl Tilse, Rosamund Harrington and Gillian Parker – to this 
research program. Further information about the study can be found at 
http://www.uq.edu.au/swahs/arc-lifetime. 
3 We acknowledge that Breda et al (2006) have previously delineated three ‘models of long-term care 
for disabled people’ which respectively focus on the individual, the family informally supporting the 
individual and the organizational provider providing formal care. While there are some similarities to 
our work, their rationale for delineating models is different to ours. They delineate by where the 
focus of the services lies, rather than the locus of coordinating activities. Further, we have no family 
model, and their organizational model is split in our work into caseworker and dwelling models. 
4 The use of the open-source program NodeXL to generate the Figures in this paper is acknowledged. 
Details about its use can be found at http://nodexl.codeplex.com/ and in Hansen et al (2011).  
